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Abstract
We formulate a mixed triopoly in which one state enterprise competes with one domestic
and one foreign private enterprise. The private enterprise can transfer its technology to the
private rival, which reduces the rival’s production cost. We show that if the privatization
policy is endogenous, the foreign firm voluntary transfers its technology, even without fees. We
also show that the domestic private firm does not transfer its technology to the foreign firm.
Consequently, the domestic private enterprise extracts rents from the foreign enterprise and
increases its market share. We also show that the foreign enterprise may strategically raise its
local ownership share, which implies that the existence of a state enterprise and its potential
future privatization serve as an industrial policy that improves the domestic firm’s competitive
advantage relative to the foreign enterprise or the implicit foreign ownership regulation.
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Highlights
A mixed oligopoly with constant marginal costs is examined.
A firms’ profit may increase with the reduction of rivals’ costs.
Foreign firms voluntary transfer their technology to domestic firms.
Foreign firms voluntary accept domestic ownership, even if it raises costs.
State firms serve as implicit protection policies.
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1 Introduction
The last 50 years saw a worldwide wave of privatization of state-owned public enterprises. Never-
theless, many public enterprises with significant government ownership are still active in strategic
sectors and control large portions of the world’s resources. According to an OECD report by
Kowalski et al. (2013), more than 10% of the 2000 largest companies are public enterprises, and
their sales are equivalent to approximately 6% of worldwide GDP. They are significant players in
sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance in OECD countries. In
planned and transitional countries such as China, Vietnam, and Russia, public enterprises still
have a significant presence and compete with private enterprises (Huang and Yang, 2016; Chen,
2017; Fridman, 2018).
We often observe technology transfers from foreign to domestic enterprises in such countries, as
well as international disputes over technology transfers. For example, US and EU claimed unfair
technology transfer from foreign to domestic enterprises in China, and the EU took the issue to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China (Bloomberg, 2018/6/2). However, the issue
of unfair technology transfers is not limited to formal legislation and regulations. For example,
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. voluntary transferred its high speed train technology without
a license fee, a move criticized by the media and other Japanese enterprises (Business Journal,
2013/6/28).
In this study, we discuss voluntary technology transfer without formal license fees. We demon-
strate that even without government pressure on foreign enterprises, these firms voluntary transfer
technology to domestic (local) enterprises when the economy has state enterprises that face po-
tential privatization in the future. We also show that technology transfer will likely occur in only
one direction (i.e., domestic enterprises do not transfer technology to foreign enterprises even if
domestic enterprises have superior knowledge). These results suggest that state enterprises may
serve as an implicit industrial policy that extracts advanced technology from foreign firms and im-
proves domestic firms’ productivity. Therefore, a stricter implementation of the WTO rule might
not be sufficient to protect firms from such an implicit industry policy.
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Next, we formulate a model in which foreign ownership share in private enterprises is endoge-
nous.1 We show that foreign enterprises voluntary increase the local ownership share in them, even
when it raises their production costs. This result suggests that state enterprises may serve as an
implicit foreign ownership regulation.
The literature on mixed oligopolies investigated the property of optimal license contracts (Ye,
2012; Niu, 2015; Gelves and Heywood, 2016; Kim et al., 2018) and optimal patent protection
policy (Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006). However, this study differs in that we focus on voluntary
technology transfer without license fees and patent protection.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section
3 discusses voluntary technology transfer. Section 4 formulates the model of endogenous foreign
ownership share. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a mixed triopoly model with competition between one state enterprise, firm 0, and
two private enterprises, firms 1 and 2.2 Domestic investors, including the government, own firm
0.3
The foreign ownership share in firm 1 (firm 2) is θ1 (θ2). Firms produce homogeneous products
with an inverse demand function of
p(Q) = a−Q,
where p denotes price, a is a positive constant, and Q :=
∑2
i=0 qi is the total output.
The marginal costs of firm i is ci (i = 0, 1, 2). Private firm i chooses whether to transfer its
1Whether the private firm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed
oligopolies; see Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n (2005a, 2005b). The optimal degree of privatization decreases with the foreign ownership rate in private
firms when the number of private firms is exogenous (Lin and Matsumura, 2012), while it increases with the foreign
ownership rate in private firms in free-entry markets (Cato and Matsumura, 2012). However, in these studies, the
foreign ownership share of private enterprises is given exogenously.
2Our results hold in more general mixed oligopolies with n-private firms. We discuss this point in footnote 11.
3The assumption that the investors in privatized firms are domestic is standard in the literature (Cato and
Matsumura, 2012; Lee et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2016;2017), and may be realistic. For example, the foreign ownership
share among the private owners in Postal Bank is about one-fifth of the Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group. For a
discussion of foreign investors in privatized firms, see Lin and Matsumura (2012).
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knowledge to its private rival, firm j (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).4 If firm i transfers its technology, firm j’s
marginal cost is cj = c¯j −di. We assume that the technology transfer is not verifiable and thus not
contractible. Therefore, firm i cannot charge fees for the transfer, and only a voluntary transfer
without a fee is possible. We assume that c0 > c¯i and c¯i > dj > 0 for (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).5
Firm i’s profit is pii = (p− ci)qi, where qi is firm i’s output. The domestic social surplus W is
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − pQ+ pi0 + (1− θ1)pi1 + (1− θ2)pi2.
Following Matsumura (1998), the public firm’s objective is a convex combination of social surplus
and their own profit Ω = αpi0 + (1 − α)W .6 α ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of privatization. In
the case of full nationalization (i.e., α = 0), firm 0 maximizes social welfare. In the case of full
privatization (i.e., α = 1), firm 0 maximizes its profit. Each private firm’s objective is its profit.
The complete information game runs as follows. In the first stage, each private firm i indepen-
dently chooses whether it transfers its knowledge to its private rival, firm j (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j). In
the second stage, the government chooses α.7 In the third stage, each firm simultaneously chooses
its output to maximize its objective. Throughout this study, we solve the game by backward
induction and the equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium
First, we solve the third stage game given α and ci. The public firm’s first-order condition is
p+ αp′q0 − c0 − p′(1− α)(θ1q1 + θ2q2) = 0. (1)
The first order-condition for each private firm is
p+ p′qi − ci = 0. (2)
4A foreign firm may transfer its advanced technology to a domestic firm. A domestic firm may transfer its
knowledge of how to manage a domestic market, such as how to negotiate with the local government or how to
advertise their products for local consumers effectively.
5The assumptions of linear demand and constant marginal costs with a cost disadvantage for the public firm over
private firms is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Pal (1998), Capuano and De Feo (2010), and
Matsumura and Ogawa (2010). For a discussion of the endogenous cost disadvantage of public firms, see Matsumura
and Matsushima (2004).
6For an empirical evidence supporting welfare-concerned objectives of public enterprises rather than profit-
maximizing, see Ogura (2018).
7We rationalize this timeline in the last paragraph in Section 3.
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The second-order conditions are satisfied. These first-order conditions yield the following equilib-
rium quantities of public and private firms in the third stage:
qT0 (α) =
(1 + (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))(a+ c1 + c2)− 3c0 − 3(1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2) , (3)
qTi (α) =
α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))ci
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2) , (4)
respectively (the superscript T indicates the “third-stage subgame”).
We obtain the following equilibrium total output, price, private firms’ profit, and welfare:
QT (α) =
(1 + 2α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))a− c0 − α(c1 + c2)− (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2) , (5)
pT (α) =
α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2) , (6)
piTi (α) =
(α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))ci
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2)
)2
, (7)
W T (α) =
X1
2(1 + (n+ 1)α)2 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2) , (8)
respectively, where we describe X1 in Appendix A.
Next, we discuss the government’s welfare maximization problem in the second stage. The
first-order condition is
∂W T
∂α
= − X2(
1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2)
)3 = 0, (9)
where we describe X2 in Appendix A.
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Let αS be the equilibrium degree of privatization (the superscript S indicates the “second-stage
subgame”). From the first-order condition, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 Let
c¯0 :=
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a+ 5(c1 + c2) + 2(c2 − 3c1)θ1 + 2(c1 − 3c2)θ2
11− 2(θ1 + θ2) ,
α∗ :=
(2 + θ1 + θ2)c0 − (1 + θ2)c1 − (1 + θ1)c2
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a− 3(3− θ1 − θ2)c0 + (4− 6θ1 + θ2)c1 + (4 + θ1 − 6θ2)c2 > 0,
θ¯i :=
a− c0 + θj(a+ 2c0 − 3cj)
3(c0 − cj) .
8We show that the relevant second-order condition is satisfied in the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
6
(i) If c0 < c¯0, then α
S = α∗. (ii) If c0 ≥ c¯0, then αS = 1. (iii) α∗ is increasing in c0. (iv) For
i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j, if θi < θ¯i (θi > θ¯i), then α∗ is decreasing (increasing) in ci where θ¯i ≥ 23 +
θj
6 .
Proof See Appendix B.
Lemma 1(i,ii) implies that αS > 0.9 Lemma 1(iii) states that as long as αS < 1 (i.e., full
privatization is not optimal), the optimal degree of privatization increases with the cost of firm 0.
Lemma 1(iv) states that as long as αS < 1, the optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases)
with the cost of firm 1 when the foreign ownership share in firm 1 is small (large).
An increase of the degree of privatization makes firm 0 less aggressive because it is less concerned
with consumer surplus. Through the strategic interaction, firm 0’s less aggressive behavior makes
the private firms more aggressive. In other words, there is production substitution from the public
firm to the private firms. Because the public firm has higher marginal cost than any private firm
does, this production substitution improves welfare (welfare-improving effect).10 However, because
the total output is decreasing in α, an increase of the degree of privatization reduces welfare
(welfare-reducing effect). This trade-off determines the optimal degree of privatization. The higher
c0 is, the stronger is the welfare-improving effect of production substitution. Therefore, the optimal
degree of privatization is increasing in c0.
Suppose that the foreign ownership share in firm 1 is small; then, the lower c1 is, the stronger
is the welfare-improving effect of production substitution. Therefore, the optimal degree of priva-
tization is decreasing in c1.
Suppose that foreign ownership share in firm 1 is large. The welfare-improving effect of pro-
duction substitution is weaker when c1 is lower because the rent firm 1 obtains flows out to foreign
investors and this is higher when c1 is lower. Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is
increasing in c1.
Let piS be the equilibrium profit of the second-stage subgame. Suppose that the solution of
the second stage is interior (i.e., αS < 1). By substituting α∗ into piTi (α), we obtain the following
9Matsumura (1998) showed this result for duopolies and Matsumura and Kanda (2005) show this result for
oligopolies in the case of domestic private firms.
10For an excellent discussion of welfare-improving production substitution, see Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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equilibrium profit of private firms:
piSi =
(
3c0 − 2ci − cj − 2θj(ci − cj)
1 + 2(θ1 + θ2)
)2
(i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j). (10)
Suppose that αS = 1. By substituting α = 1 into piTi (α), we obtain the following equilibrium
profit of private firms:
piSi =
(
a+ c0 − 3ci + cj
4
)2
(i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j). (11)
We now present an important result that describes the key properties we use throughout this
study.
Proposition 1 For i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j, (i) private firm i’s profit is decreasing in ci; (ii) private
firm i’s profit is increasing in cj as long as α
S remains unchanged; (iii) αS remains unchanged by
the change of cj if α
∗ ≥ 1 (and thus, αS = 1) with and without a change in cj; (iv) if θj < 1/2
(θj > 1/2, θj = 1/2), then private firm i’s profit is decreasing in (increasing in, independent of)
cj as long as the optimal privatization policy is not full privatization (i.e., α
S < 1).
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 1(i–iii) is intuitive. We explain the intuition behind Proposition 1(iv).
Given α, a decrease in cj increases qj and reduces the price, which reduces firm i’s profit
(i = 1, 2, i ̸= j). However, cj may affect α.
Suppose that θj < θ¯j ; then, a decrease in cj strengthens the welfare-improving effect of produc-
tion substitution from the public firm (firm 0) to private firm j. Thus, a decrease in cj increases
the degree of privatization unless α = 1, which makes the public firm less aggressive and raises the
profits of each private firm. Because the welfare-improving effect of production substitution from
the public firm (firm 0) to private firm j is stronger when θj is smaller, the latter (former) effect
dominates the former (latter) effect when θj is small (large).
Suppose that θj > θ¯j(> 1/2). A decrease in cj decreases the degree of privatization unless
α = 1. Thus, both effects reduce firm i’ profit. These yield Proposition 1(iv).11
11This Proposition holds in more general mixed oligopolies with n private firms. For i, j = 1, 2, ..., n, i ̸= j, firm
i’s profit is decreasing in cj if α
S < 1 and θj < 1/2, and increasing if α
S = 1 or θj > 1/2.
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We now discuss the first stage. From Proposition 1, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 For i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j, (i) firm i does not transfer its technology to firm j if θj > 1/2
or α = 1 without its transfer; (ii) firm i transfers its technology to firm j if θj < 1/2 and α < 1
with its transfer.
Suppose that θ1 < 1/2 and θ2 > 1/2; as long as the solution in the second stage is interior
(i.e., α < 1), the foreign firm (firm 2) voluntary transfers its technology to the domestic firm (frim
1), whereas the domestic firm does not transfer its technology to the foreign firm. This implies
that even without government pressure on the foreign firm, the foreign firm voluntary transfers
its technology to the domestic firm. The existence of the state enterprise and its potential future
privatization encourage the foreign firm to transfer its technology to the domestic firm. This result
suggests that the state enterprises may serve as an implicit industrial policy that extracts advanced
technology from foreign firms and improves domestic firms’ productivity.
We note that Proposition 2 depends on the assumption that the government implements the
privatization policy given the firms’ costs. If the government implements the privatization policy
and then the firms’ costs are determined, Proposition 2 does not hold. Each private firm’s profit
always increases with the rivals’ costs, and thus, each private firm never transfers its technology
to the rival. Although several works on mixed oligopolies assume that the government implements
the privatization policy before the firms’ costs are determined, we believe that our time structure
is equally realistic.12
As Lee et al. (2018) and Sato and Matsumura (2018) point out, even when the government
chooses α before the cost structure is determined, our timeline is adequate because the government
can change α after observing the cost structure. For example, the Japanese government reduced
its ownership of NTT gradually over 30 years. Japan Post, which owns part of Postal Bank, the
largest bank in Japan, was first privatized in 2015; the government then sold some shares in 2017,
and plans to sell further shares in the future. The Japanese government first sold shares in Japan
12See Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), and Gil-Molto´ et al. (2011).
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Tobacco (JT) in 1994, again in 1996, and finally in 2004. The French government increased its
ownership of Renault from 15% to 19.4% in 2015, and again reduced it to 15% thereafter. These
examples suggest that our timeline is realistic.
4 Endogenous Foreign Ownership
In this section, we endogenize the foreign ownership share in firm 2. We again consider a mixed
triopoly model in which one state enterprise, firm 0, and two private enterprises, firms 1 and 2,
compete. Firms 0 and 1 are domestic enterprises, and firm 2 is a foreign enterprise. Initially, firm
2 is a pure foreign firm. Firm 2 sells an ownership share of 1 − θ to domestic (local) investors.
We assume that firm 1 cannot obtain this share due to anti-trust legislation. We also assume that
the financial market is complete and firm 2 sells its share at a competitive price. In other words,
domestic investors obtain a share of (1 − θ) at the price of (1 − θ)pie2, where pie2 is the expected
profit of firm 2.
The marginal costs of firms 0 and 1 are c0 and c1 = c¯1 − d2(< c0), respectively, and are given
exogenously. Firm 2’s marginal cost c2 = c¯2 − kθ − d1 if firm 1 transfers its knowledge to firm 2
and c2 = c¯2 − kθ otherwise, where k is a positive constant and c¯2 − kθ − d1 > 0. In other words,
a lager foreign ownership share in firm 2 reduces its cost. This assumption may be rational if
better governance through the larger foreign ownership share improves the firm’s productivity.13
We assume that k > k¯ := 3c0 − c1 − 2(c¯2 − d1).14
The game runs as follows. In the first stage, firm 2 chooses θ2. In the second stage, firm 1
chooses whether it transfers its knowledge to firm 2. In the third stage, the government chooses
α. In the fourth stage, three firms independently choose their outputs.
We analyzed the fourth and third stages in the previous section. In the second stage, firm 1
transfers its knowledge to firm 2 only if θ2 ≤ 1/2. Suppose that θ2 ≤ 1/2. When firm 1 transfers
13See Arnold and Javorcik (2009), Guadalupe et al. (2012), Syverson (2011), and Huang and Yang (2016).
14If k < k¯, firm 2 chooses θ2 = 0 to make firm 0 less aggressive, and no firm with a positive foreign ownership
share exists in equilibrium.
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its knowledge to firm 2, firm 1’s profit is
pi1 =

(
3c0 − 2c1 − c¯2 + d1 + (k − 2d1 + 2c¯2 − 2c1)θ2 − 2kθ22
1 + 2θ2
)2
if c0 < cˆ0 (12a)(
a+ c0 − 3c1 + c¯2 − d1 − kθ2
4
)2
otherwise (12b)
where
cˆ0 :=
a+ 5(c1 + c¯2 − d1) + (2a+ 2c1 − 6(c¯2 − d1)− 5k)θ2 + 6kθ22
11− 2θ2 .
When firm 1 does not transfer its knowledge to firm 2, firm 1’s profit is
pi1 =

(
3c0 − 2c1 − c¯2 + (k + 2c¯2 − 2c1)θ2 − 2kθ22
1 + 2θ2
)2
if c0 < cˇ0 (13a)(
a+ c0 − 3c1 + c¯2 − kθ2
4
)2
otherwise (13b)
where
cˇ0 :=
a+ 5(c1 + c¯2) + (2a+ 2c1 − 6c¯2 − 5k)θ2 + 6kθ22
11− 2θ2 .
From (12a)–(13b), we find that firm 1 transfers its knowledge if and only if θ2 ≤ 1/2 and
c0 < c
∗
0(θ2) :=
a+ 5(c1 + c¯2)− d1 + (2a+ 2c1 − 6c¯2 − 2d1 − 5k)θ2 + 6kθ22
11− 2θ2 . (14)
From (14), we obtain
∂c∗0(θ2)
∂θ2
=
24a+ 32c1 − 56c¯2 − 24d1 − 55k + 132kθ2 − 12kθ22
(11− 2θ2)2 > 0
if and only if a >
12kθ22 − 132kθ2 + 55k + 56c¯2 + 24d1 − 32c1
24
.
Thus, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that a is sufficiently large that
a >
12kθ22 − 132kθ2 + 55k + 56c¯2 + 24d1 − 32c1
24
. (15)
If firm 1 does not transfers its knowledge when θ = θ′ < 1/2, then firm 1 does not transfer its
knowledge when θ < θ′.
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If αS becomes one when firm 1 transfers its knowledge to firm 2, firm 1 has less incentive to
transfer knowledge because it does not increase α further. αS is less likely to become one when θ2
is larger, which yields Lemma 2.
In the first stage, firm 2 chooses θ2. Suppose that firm 1 transfers its knowledge regardless of
θ2 as long as θ2 ≤ 1/2. Then, firm 2’s profit is
pi2 =

(
3c0 − c1 − 2(c2 − d1) + 2kθ2
1 + 2θ2
)2
if c0 < cˆ0, (16a)(
a+ c0 + c1 − 3(c¯2 − d1) + kθ2
4
)2
otherwise. (16b)
Suppose that firm 1 does not transfer its knowledge, regardless of θ2. Then, firm 2’s profit is
pi2 =

(
3c0 − c1 − 2c2 + 2kθ2
1 + 2θ2
)2
if c0 < cˇ0, (17a)(
a+ c0 + c1 − 3c¯2 + kθ2
4
)2
otherwise. (17b)
Both are increasing in θ. Therefore, firm 2 chooses either θ = 1 or the maximum θ that induces
technology transfer, if it exists.
Henceforth, we assume that a is sufficiently large that (15) is satisfied.
If c0 ≥ c∗0(1/2) := (2a+ 6c1 + 2(c¯2 − d1)− k)/10, then firm 1 does not transfers its knowledge,
regardless of the value of θ. Given this fact, firm 2’s profit is increasing in θ, and thus firm 2
chooses θ2 = 1.
If c0 < c
∗
0(1/2), then firm 1 transfers its knowledge if and only if θ2 ≤ 1/2. Thus, firm 2’s profit
is increasing in θ for θ2 ∈ [0, 1/2), it is discontinuously down at θ2 = 1/2, and again increases in θ
for θ2 ∈ (1/2, 1] (See Figure 1). Therefore, the optimal θ2 is either θ = 1/215 or θ = 1. The former
is better for firm 2 if and only if k is small (See the Proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B). This
leads to our second main result.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium foreign ownership share is 1/2 if k < k∗, where k∗ := 3c0 − c1 −
2c¯2 + 6d1(> k¯). Otherwise, the equilibrium foreign ownership share is one.
Proof See Appendix B.
15Strictly speaking, the maximum ownership share satisfying θ2 < 1/2, such as 0.49.
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Firm 2 will accept a minor foreign ownership share to receive support from firm 1. This
suggests that the existence of a state firm and its possible future privatization may serve as an
implicit foreign ownership regulation.
Figure 1: The Foreign Firm’s Profit
5 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we investigate how privatization policy serves as an industrial policy. The existence
of state enterprises and their potential future privatization encourages voluntary technology trans-
fers from foreign enterprises to domestic enterprises. We also show that foreign enterprises may
strategically increase the domestic ownership share, even when it raises costs, to cooperate with
domestic enterprises when state enterprises will be privatized in future. Therefore, privatization
policy serves as implicit foreign ownership regulation. These results suggest that even the imple-
mentation of a formal WTO may not be sufficient to protect foreign firms from technology transfer
without fees or restrictions of foreign ownership shares.
In this study, we focus only on voluntary technology transfer without fees. If we consider
license contracts, the type of contract (royalty or fixed fee) also affects the degree of privatization
and the private firm’s resulting profits. Extending our analysis to license contracts remains a task
for future research.
13
In this study, we assume that all enterprises compete in a homogeneous product market. Public
enterprises or domestic enterprises may provide vertically or horizontally differentiated products
from private enterprises or foreign enterprises. Extending our analysis to a multi-product model
remains for future research.16
16For discussions of optimal privatization policy in multi-market models, see Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017),
Dong et al. (2018), and Haraguchi et al. (2018).
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Appendix A
X1 := ((1 + 2α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))a− c0 − α(c1 + c2)− (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2))2
+2
(
α(a+ c1 + c2) + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)− (3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))c0
)
(
(1 + (1− α))(a+ c1 + c2)− 3c0 − 3(1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
)
+2(1− θ1)(α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))c1)2
+2(1− θ2)(α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))c2)2.
X2 :=
(
(1 + (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))(a+ c1 + c2)− 3c0 − 3(1− α)(θ1c2 + θ2c2)
)
(
α((1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a− 3(3− θ1 − θ2)c0 + (4− 6θ1 + θ2)c1 + (4 + θ1 − 6θ2)c2)
−((2 + θ1 + θ2)c0 − (1 + θ2)c1 − (1 + θ1)c2)
)
.
Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
First, we show Lemma 1(ii). We show that X2 < 0 if c0 ≥ c¯0.
Because we assume interior solutions in the third stage, from (3), we obtain (1 + (1− α)(θ1 +
θ2))(a+ c1+ c2)− 3c0− 3(1−α)(θ1c1+ θ2c2) > 0. When c0 ≥ c¯0, α((1 + 2(θ1+ θ2))a− 3(3− θ1−
θ2)c0 + (4 − 6θ1 + θ2)c1 + (4 + θ1 − 6θ2)c2) − ((2 + θ1 + θ2)c0 − (1 + θ2)c1 − (1 + θ1)c2) < 0 for
α < 1. Thus, from (9) we obtain ∂W T /∂α > 0 for α < 1. This implies Lemma 1(ii).
Next, we show Lemma 1(i). Suppose that c0 < c¯0; by solving ∂W
T /∂α = 0 with respect to α,
we obtain
α∗ =
(2 + θ1 + θ2)c0 − (1 + θ2)c1 − (1 + θ1)c2
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a− 3(3− θ1 − θ2)c0 + (4− 6θ1 + θ2)c1 + (4 + θ1 − 6θ2)c2 ∈ (0, 1). (18)
The second-order condition
− (a− 9c0 + 4(c1 + c2) + θ1(2a+ 3c0 − 6c1 + c2) + θ2(2a+ 3c0 + c1 − 6c2))
4
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))3(a− 3c0 + c1 + c2 + θ1(a+ c0 − 3c1 + c2) + θ2(a+ c0 + c1 − 3c2))2 < 0
is satisfied. Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is α∗. This implies Lemma 1(i).
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From (18), we obtain
∂α∗
∂c0
=
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))(2a− c1 − c2 + θ1(a− 3c1 + 2c2) + θ2(a+ 2c1 − 3c2))
((1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a− 3(3− θ1 − θ2)c0 + (4− 6θ1 + θ2)c1 + (4 + θ1 − 6θ2)c2)2 > 0.
This implies Lemma 1(iii).
From (18), we obtain
∂α∗
∂ci
= − (1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))(a− c0 − 3θi(c0 − cj) + θj(a+ 2c0 − 3cj))
((1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))a− 3(3− θ1 − θ2)c0 + (4− 6θi + θj)ci + (4 + θi − 6θj)cj)2 ≷ 0
↔ θi ≷ a− c0 + θj(a+ 2c0 − 3cj)
3(c0 − cj) (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).
This implies that α∗ is decreasing (increasing) in ci if θi < (>) θ¯i.
Finally, we show that θ¯i ≥ 2/3 + θj/6 by showing that α∗ is decreasing in ci if (but not only
if) θi < 2/3+ θj/6. Since the numerator of α
∗ is decreasing in ci, then α∗ is decreasing in ci if the
denominator of α∗ is increasing in ci. The denominator of α∗ is increasing in ci if 4− 6θi+ θj > 0,
which implies that α∗ is decreasing in ci if θi < 2/3 + θj/6. These imply Lemma 1(iv). ■
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that α is given exogenously. Because we assume interior solutions in the quantity competi-
tion stage, from (4), we obtain α(a+c1+c2)+c0+(1−α)(θ1c1+θ2c2)−(1+3α+(1−α)(θ1+θ2))ci >
0 (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j). From (7), we obtain
∂piTi (α)
∂ci
= − 2
(1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))2
(
(α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))ci)
)
(1 + 2α+ (1− α)θj) < 0 (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j),
∂piTi (α)
∂cj
=
2
(1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))2
(
(α(a+ c1 + c2) + c0 + (1− α)(θ1c1 + θ2c2)
− (1 + 3α+ (1− α)(θ1 + θ2))ci)
)
(α+ (1− α)θj) > 0 (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).
These imply Proposition 1(i,ii).
From Lemma 1(ii), αS = 1 for any α∗ ≥ 1. Thus, the change in α∗ due to the change in cj
does not affect αS and αS = 1 as long as α∗ ≥ 1. This implies Proposition 1(iii).
Suppose that the solution of the second stage is interior (i.e., αS < 1). By substituting α∗ into
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qTi (α), we obtain the following equilibrium output of private firms:
qSi =
3c0 − 2ci − cj − 2θj(ci − cj)
1 + 2(θ1 + θ2)
(i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j). (19)
Because we assume interior solutions in the quantity competition stage, from (19), we obtain
3c0 − 2ci − cj − 2θj(ci − cj) > 0 (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).17 From (10), we obtain
∂piSi
∂ci
= −4(1 + θj)(3c0 − 2ci − cj + 2θj(cj − ci))
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))2
< 0 (i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j),
∂piSi
∂cj
= −(1− 2θj)(3c0 − 2ci − cj + 2θj(cj − ci))
(1 + 2(θ1 + θ2))2
≷ 0↔ θj ≷ 1
2
(i, j = 1, 2, i ̸= j).
These results imply Proposition 1(iv). ■
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that c∗0(1/2) > c0 and a is sufficiently large such that (15) is satisfied; then, the optimal
degree of privatization is interior for θ ∈ [1/2, 1].18 Comparing (16a) with θ2 = 1/2 and (17a) with
θ2 = 1, we obtain
pi2(1/2)− pi2(1) = (15c0 − 5c1 − 10c¯2 + 6d1 + 7k)(3c0 − c1 − 2c¯2 + 6d1 − k)
36
≷ 0
↔ k ≶ 3c0 − c1 − 2c¯2 + 6d1 := k∗.
This implies Proposition 3.■
173c0− 2ci− cj − 2θj(ci− cj) is positive if c0 is sufficiently large. Even when c0 is large, the equilibrium output of
the public firm can be positive if a is sufficiently large such that a > (9c0−2(2−2θ1+θ2)c1−2(2+θ1−2θ2)c2)/(1+
2(θ1 + θ2)).
18This is because ∂c∗0/∂θ2 > 0 and cˇ0 > cˆ0 ≥ c∗0 for any θ2 ∈ [1/2, 1].
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